You are reading the tutorials for Cordon 0.6 (0.6.0). Read this for 0.7, the current release.
What changed since the last release
An attacker can disguise code. They cannot hide that it changed. Most real supply-chain compromises -- a maintainer account taken over, a malicious version of a trusted package -- show first as a difference between two releases.
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ pkg-1.4.2.tgz (the version you trust) │ │ pkg-1.4.3.tgz (the one you are about to install) │ │ │ │ cordon-scanner scan pkg-1.4.3.tgz --compare-with pkg-1.4.2.tgz │ │ │ │ or let Cordon fetch the previous release from the registry, │ │ verified against the registry's own digest: │ │ │ │ cordon-scanner scan pkg-1.4.3.tgz --online │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ NEW_INSTALL_HOOK this release runs code at install; │ │ the last did not │ │ NEW_CAPABILITY install-time code now reaches the network, starts │ │ processes or executes a payload │ │ NEW_OBFUSCATION obfuscated code where there was none │ │ NEW_BINARY compiled files that were not there before │ │ NEW_PUBLISHER (npm) a different account published it │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
On stderr Cordon says what it compared with -- compared with pkg 1.4.2: no new install hooks, capabilities, obfuscation or binaries -- so a clean result is a comparison that was made, not one that was skipped.
--online names the package to its registry; without it nothing leaves the machine.
Next: 20 · Findings in the editor.